Saint Louis University Public Law Review
Volume 28
Number 1 The Changing Tide of Trade: The
Social, Political and Environmental Implications
of Regional Trade Agreements (Volume XXVIII,
No. 1)

Article 11

2008

Metrics and the Measurement of International Trade: Some
Thoughts on the Early Operation of the WTO RTA Transparency
Mechanism
Chi Carmody
University of Western Ontario, ccarmody@uwo.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carmody, Chi (2008) "Metrics and the Measurement of International Trade: Some Thoughts on the Early
Operation of the WTO RTA Transparency Mechanism," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 28 :
No. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol28/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

METRICS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EARLY OPERATION OF THE
WTO RTA TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM

CHI CARMODY*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization1 (“WTO
Agreement”) is often said to be about “trade,” but this is only partly true.
Nothing in the WTO Agreement obliges countries to perform specific amounts
of trade. Rather, the WTO Agreement is about the trade-related behavior of
WTO member governments.2
The foregoing statements are an indication of the WTO Agreement’s
principle of “indirect effect” and the way in which the treaty’s legal system
works at one remove to achieve its aims.3 They also emphasize a basic tension
in the agreement between deductive reasoning based on an abstract model and
inductive reasoning based on empiric observation. The tension is manifested
in evidentiary terms in the treaty’s use of presumptions and requirements of

* Associate Professor & Canadian Director, Canada-United States Law Institute, Faculty of Law,
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7. Email: ccarmody@uwo.ca.
The writer would like to thank the staff of the Saint Louis University Public Law Review for their
invitation to present this paper on April 4, 2008, and Ryan Brown for his research assistance.
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144–52 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
also available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf. The WTO
Agreement includes a series of separately annexed agreements that provide specific treatment for
certain items and types of disciplines. Some, but not all, of these annexed agreements, were
reproduced in the International Legal Materials (I.L.M.). Subsequent references to the WTO
Agreement or its annexed agreements will be cited to the Portable Document Format posted
online by the World Trade Organization if not reproduced in I.L.M.
2. Id. art. II, ¶ 1.
3. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.78,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents”
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter
“WT/DS152/R” under “Document symbol”) (“It may, thus, be convenient in the GATT/WTO
legal order to speak not of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of indirect effect.”).
273
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proof. In many instances WTO law simply assumes a state of affairs; in
others, it demands real evidence.4

4. For an example of perhaps the best-known presumption in WTO law, see Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 2, art. 3.8, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1228 [hereinafter DSU], available at http://www.wto.org/
gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf (DSU Art. 3.8 states that “[in] cases where there is an
infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered
prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally
a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that
covered agreement . . . .”). For evidence-based requirements, see Appellate Body Report,
Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 162–164,
WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official
Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and
enter “WT/DS161/AB/R” under “Document symbol”). The report states that “determination of
whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable,’ may nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the
contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a
series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to
the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or
values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation
on imports or exports.” (emphasis added). Id. See also Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
1A, art. 3.4, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf (stating
that impact examination “shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices .
. .”); id. art. 3.5 (causal relationship determination “shall be based on an examination of all
relevant evidence before the authorities”); id. Annex II, ¶ 1 (determinations permissible on the
basis of facts available); id. art. 5.3; id. art. 5.8; id. arts. 6.1, 6.6 (accuracy and adequacy of
evidence, and opportunity to present); id. art. 10.7 (sufficiency of evidence); id. art. 11.2
(evidence required for revocation); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, arts. 4.2, 11–12, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_
docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf; Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art.
8.3, Annex I, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf;
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, art. 3.3, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf
[hereinafter PSA], (scientific justification); id. art. 2.2 (evidentiary standards for price
verifications); DSU art. 26.1 (detailed justification in support of non-violation claims). Appellate
Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 184,
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) available at http://www.wto.org/
(follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple
Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS26/AB/R” under “Document symbol”); Panel Report,
United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶
7.153, WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official
Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and
enter “WT/DS184/R” under “Document symbol”); Panel Report, Mexico—Anti-Dumping
Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States,, ¶ 7.97, WT/DS132/R
(Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under
“Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS132/R” under
“Document symbol”); Panel Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random
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One subject of coverage in the WTO Agreement that demands evidence is
regional trade agreements (RTAs). RTAs are regarded as a means of achieving
further multilateral integration but also pose the threat of trade diversion. In
other words, their potential to contribute to the broader aims of the global
trading system is tempered by the ever-present “reality” that they may divert
trade away from it.5 Consequently, the central provision of the WTO
Agreement that deals with RTAs, Art. XXIV, demands proof of the magnitude
of any such regional agreement as a means of assessing what the potential for
trade diversion is. Likewise, many of the unanswered questions in Art. XXIV
jurisprudence can be seen as attempts to grapple with probative, and therefore
essentially empiric, questions. For instance, the requirement that upon the
formation of a customs union, trade restrictions “shall not on the whole be
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties . . . prior to
the formation of such union”6 or that countries contemplating such a union
shall provide “compensatory adjustment” to their trading partners7 are
essentially questions of measurement. Whether or not the countries which
have entered into an RTA have answered them are at the core of what disputes
over the application of Art. XXIV are about.
In recent years the number of these disputes has increased as the number of
RTAs has grown. By November 2007, 385 RTAs had been notified to the
WTO, 197 of which were in force. Of the agreements in force, 125 had been
notified under GATT Art. XXIV, 22 under the Enabling Clause and 50 under

Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea, ¶ 6.43,
WT/DS99/R (Jan. 29, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents”
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter
“WT/DS99/R” under “Document symbol”); Panel Report, Guatemala—Anti-Dumping
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico,, ¶ 7.77, WT/DS60/R (June, 19, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents”
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS60/R” under “Document
symbol”); Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from
Canada, ¶ 332, SCM/162 (Oct. 27, 1993), GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 358, 488–89, available
at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink;
then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “SCM/162” under “Document symbol”).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
at Art. XXIV, ¶ 4 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
gatt47_e.pdf (GATT refers to this dual concern in the following language: “[t]he contracting
parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through
voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such
agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade
of other contracting parties with such territories.”).
6. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 5(a)–(b).
7. Id. art. XXIV, ¶ 6.
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GATS Art. V.8 These numbers virtually guarantee that questions of proof—
and competing ones of presumption—will remain at the forefront of
consideration of the role of RTAs in the WTO system in years to come. The
main issue is whether countries will continue to insist on proof concerning the
questions referred to above, or whether they will be content to presume that
RTAs are a necessary part of trade liberalization. Arguably, the stalemate that
has evolved over the approval of RTAs under GATT and the WTO Agreement
can be taken to be a sign that while countries are de jure committed to
measurement and metrifying the impact of RTAs, a de facto presumption
exists in WTO law that RTAs are useful.
The WTO’s much-vaunted dispute settlement system has only been able to
cast some light on these questions. Case law furnishes indications about the
bare legal requirements for an RTA, yet decisions have not been able to
resolve the issue whether individual RTAs comply with the WTO Agreement.
Indeed, in Turkey—Textiles the panel maintained that “it is arguable” that
panels do not have the jurisdiction to do so.9 What current experience points to
then is a need for some means of assessing the compatibility of RTAs with the
WTO Agreement.
Provisional approval of an RTA Transparency Mechanism (TM) by the
WTO membership on December 14, 2006, is a step in that direction and raises
important questions as to why the TM is necessary, what specific functions it is
designed to serve, and whether it moves the debate about proof-versuspresumption forward.10 Briefly stated, the TM seeks to promote

8. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Draft Report (2007) of the Committee
on Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, ¶ 4, WT/REG/W/51 (Nov. 14, 2007),
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents”
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/W/51” under “Document
symbol”).
9. Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions On Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 9.53,
WT/DS34/R, (May 31, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents”
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter
“WT/DS34/R” under “Document symbol”). The Appellate Body has likewise been reticent to do
so, overturning panel decisions finding that an RTA conforms with provisions of Art. XXIV and
therefore constitutes a defense to substantive violations of the WTO Agreement. See Appellate
Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, ¶ 198–199, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 2002), available
at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink;
then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS202/AB/R” under “Document
symbol”).
10. See generally WTO General Council, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade
Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 18 2006) [hereinafter Transparency Mechanism], available at
http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then
follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/L/671” under “Document symbol”).
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transparency—that is “openness and understanding”11—about the operation of
RTAs by building a database of information concerning them and thereby
making comparison between them more straightforward. The hope is that
clearer information will eventually allow the development of benchmarks
against which fulfillment of the requirements of Art. XXIV can be measured.
It is too early to pass judgment on the TM’s success or failure. However,
the preliminary indications are not encouraging. So far the Mechanism has
experienced a number of “teething problems,”12 and WTO reports refer to
“delays in the receipt of statistical data, data discrepancies in Members’
submissions, and delays in receipt of comments from the parties.”13 This
record has undermined one of the most notable attributes of the new
Mechanism, speed, and required the consideration of several RTAs to be
postponed. While not stated openly, an unspoken fear seems to be growing
that the TM may become an ineffectual appendage of the WTO system,
essentially replicating experience with the WTO Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM).14
A reading of the minutes of the WTO Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements (CRTA) also suggests that a careful dance is taking place as
countries become accustomed to the TM provisions and warily reveal
information about the RTAs they have entered into. TM paragraph ten
provides that nothing in the Secretariat’s collection of information—known as
a ‘factual presentation’—“shall be used as a basis for dispute settlement
procedures or to create new rights and obligations for [WTO] Members.” 15
However, the behavior of countries betrays a different attitude, one of
watchfulness and apprehension. No country appears willing to “bare it all” or,

11. Samuli Seppänen, Good Governance in International Law, ERIK CASTRÉN INSTITUTE
RESEARCH REPORTS, Erik Castrén Institute of Int’l Law and Human Rights at the Univ. of
Helsinki 102 (2003) (Fin.).
12. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14–15 May
2007, ¶ 8, WT/REG/M/46 (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official
Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and
enter “WT/REG/M/46” under “Document symbol”).
13. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Draft Report (2007) of the Committee
on Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, ¶ 16, WT/REG/W/51 (Nov. 14, 2007),
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents”
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/W/51” under “Document
symbol”).
14. See generally Petros C. Mavroidis, Surveillance Schemes: The GATT’s New Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 374 (1992); but see Julien Chaisse & Debashis
Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153
(2007) (finding a relationship between issues raised in Trade Policy Reviews and subsequent
legal challenges launched in WTO dispute settlement).
15. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 10.
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at any rate, to acknowledge the conclusions that information gathered under
the TM might suggest—at least not yet.16
This article is therefore focused on what the TM is, what early experience
with it has been, and what functions it could serve in future. Current
developments infer that there will soon come a time when a need to use the
information being gathered by the TM will arise, and this, in turn, raises the
question of how customs unions and free trade agreements are to be analyzed.
Methodologies will have to be developed. At the same time, a purely
quantitative approach to the task seems to be at odds with the evolving
understanding of Art. XXIV. New methods of analysis, possibly inspired by
techniques of regulatory impact assessment (RIA),17 may be more appropriate.
This article is divided into four parts. Following the Introduction, Part II
deals with the RTA Transparency Mechanism and its requirements. Part III
provides a summary of experience with the TM to date. Part IV examines the
development of alternatives to quantification by examining the experience of
regulatory impact assessment in Canada and other countries. This experience
may be relevant to operation of the TM in future. Finally, Part V offers a brief
conclusion.
II. THE WTO RTA TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM
The WTO TM is designed to enhance the transparency of information
concerning RTAs. Contrary to what might be expected, however, the TM is
not the first attempt to promote transparency in GATT or the WTO Agreement
concerning RTAs. A 1996 Note by the WTO Secretariat observed that in early
GATT practice, parties to RTAs notified under Art. XXIV furnished specific
information requested by GATT working parties, but apparently little more.18

16. In this respect, even a major WTO participant like the United States has expressed the
view that it “did not really see the basis for analytical work being pursued in the context of a
database[,]” Note on the Meeting of 14-15 May 2007, supra note 12, ¶ 24, put together under the
auspices of the TM and that WTO Secretariat officials have taken pains to assure the membership
that they “would be very careful to make sure that none of the information that was on the
database would compromise the position of Members vis-à-vis each other.” Id. ¶ 26.
17. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], Trade Directorate,
Trade Committee, Regulatory Reform and Market Openness: Processes to Assess Effectively the
Trade and Investment Impact of Regulation, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 48, at 11,
OECD Doc. TD/TC/WP(2006)40/FINAL (Feb. 9, 2007) (prepared by David Shortall)
[hereinafter Regulatory Reform and Market Openness], available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/
olis/2006doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00007782/$FILE/JT03221506.PDF (defining RIA as “an analytical
and systematic approach to regulation encompassing a range of tools and techniques aimed at
assessing the impacts of regulation”).
18. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note by the Secretariat, Checklist of
Points on Reporting on the Operation of Regional Agreements, WT/REG/W/3 (June 20, 1996)
[hereinafter Checklist of Points], available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents”

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

METRICS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

279

The Note goes on to observe that this ad hoc approach led to a lack of
consistency in the reporting procedure, something which prompted the GATT
Contracting Parties to adopt a Decision in 1971 establishing a calendar of fixed
dates for the biennial examination of existing RTAs.19 The 1971 Decision
failed to eliminate all of the shortcomings concerning this issue:
Biennial reports on regional agreements in accordance with the 1971
Decision were regularly received until 1986. From the early 1980s, however,
there was very little discussion of the reports in the meetings of the GATT
Council of Representatives, and as of 1987, no reports have been received on
20
agreements notified under Article XXIV.

In 1994, a further attempt at transparency was introduced in the form of the
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, which was agreed to as
Nevertheless, the wording of the
part of the WTO Agreement.21
Understanding is only slightly more formal and precise than what existed
previously and in practice did little to solve Art. XXIV’s problems.
The TM is the latest attempt to deal with these problems. It has five
principal features: early announcement of RTA negotiations; notification of
concluded RTAs; consideration of RTAs through the WTO Secretariat’s
preparation of a “factual presentation” on each RTA; subsequent notification
and reporting; and recordkeeping.
Perhaps the most salient feature of the new RTA TM is its stated emphasis
on transparency, a value that lies at the core of contemporary governance
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter
“WT/REG/W/3” under “Document symbol”).
19. Id. ¶ 2 (citing GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 38 (1971)).
20. Id.
21. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, ¶ 7, 33 I.L.M. 1161, 1162
[hereinafter Understanding on Interpretation of Article XXIV], also available at http://www.wto.
org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92160001.pdf. The Understanding on Interpretation of Article
XXIV states that “notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Art. XXIV shall be examined by a
working party . . .” which “shall submit a report to the [WTO] Council for Trade in Goods on its
findings.” Id. The Council is then left to “make such recommendations to Members as it deems
appropriate.” Id. These may include recommendations in respect of interim agreements on the
proposed time-frame for phase-in of the RTA and “on measures required to complete the
formation of the customs union or free-trade area.” Id. ¶ 8. It also requires notification of
“substantial changes” in the plan, id. ¶ 9, and schedule of interim RTAs and observes that “parties
shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such [interim] agreement if they are not
prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations.” Id. ¶ 10. It also requires that
with respect to completed RTAs “[a]ny significant changes and/or developments in the
agreements should be reported as they occur.” Id. ¶ 11. See also WTO, The Technical
Cooperation Handbook on Notification Requirements, WT/TC/NOTIF/REG/1 (Sept. 9, 1996),
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents”
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/TC/NOTIF/ REG/1” under
“Document symbol”).
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theory. In an age of accountability, transparency has come to be regarded as a
chief attribute of good governance. Definitions of good governance confirm
the point. They can be found in the work of the World Bank, which is the
originating source of good governance theory,22 as well as in the European
Commission, which has determined that the principles of good governance can
be summarized as values of openness, participation, accountability,
effectiveness and coherence. The former United Nations Human Rights
Commission (now the United Nations Human Rights Council) likewise has
identified five attributes of good governance: transparency, responsibility,
accountability, participation and responsiveness.
In each definition above what becomes abundantly clear is that
transparency is the first virtue of good governance. Thought about carefully, it
is not hard to imagine why. Transparency involves the dissemination of
information so that appraisal and decision-making can occur. Without it, other
governance values will not be realized. Transparency is therefore a precondition or requirement for virtually all other aspects of good governance.
The law of a number of domestic and international organizations
recognizes this necessity and attempts to promote it. In the European Union,
for instance, the first article of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that
the “[t]reaty marks a new state of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible.”23
Pursuant to TEU Art. 255, the European Parliament and the Council have
adopted regulations on public access to Council and Commission documents,24
and the European Court of Justice has dealt with a number of cases alleging
violation of transparency requirements in the EU context.25 Nevertheless,
commentators have observed that the European Court has not elevated
transparency to the status of “a general principle of EC law.”26

22. Seppänen, supra note 11, at 8.
23. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union and of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, tit. I, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 10 (emphasis added),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:325:0001:0184:
EN:PDF.
24. Council Regulation 1049/2001, Regarding Public Access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43, 43–48, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:145:0043:0048:EN:PDF. See also
Steve Peers, The New Regulation on Access to Documents: A Critical Analysis, 21 YEARBOOK OF
EUROPEAN LAW 385, 385 (2002).
25. See, e.g., Case T-174/95, Journalistförbundet v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. II-2289, 2312
(ECJ case law on transparency); Case T-105/95, WWF UK v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-313,
343; Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R.
1651, 1687; Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. II-2489, 2505; Case C-353/99 P,
Council v. Hautala, 2001 E.C.R I-9565, 9573.
26. Seppänen, supra note 11, at 43 (citing PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW:
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 393 (3d ed. 2003)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

METRICS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

281

In context of the WTO Agreement, transparency refers to the openness of
each WTO member, and more specifically, to making sure that information
provided by each member is “evident and discernible” to the rest of the WTO
membership. Experience under GATT and the WTO indicates that this has not
always been the case in relation to RTAs.
There is no generalized requirement for transparency or notification in
either GATT or the WTO Agreement. Instead, the WTO Agreement features a
number of individual transparency obligations tailored to specific
circumstances. Thus, GATT Art. X:1 speaks of the obligation upon countries
to publish trade-related legislation “promptly in such a manner as to enable
governments and traders to become acquainted with them” but also provides
that the obligation does “not require any contracting party to disclose
confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be
contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial
interests of particular enterprises, public or private.”27 The parallel provision
in GATS is GATS Art. III and III bis. A number of cases in GATT and WTO
dispute settlement have also dealt with the extent to which countries as well as
“individuals and bodies” have to disclose certain information.28
In GATT Art. XXIV countries are obliged to fulfill the terms of GATT
Art. XXIV:7(a) regarding disclosure of RTA arrangements as follows:
7.(a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade
area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area,
shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available
to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable
them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they
29
may deem appropriate.

This notification is supplemented by the 1996 Standard Format for
Information on Regional Trade Agreements, which is designed “to facilitate
and standardize the provision of initial information by parties to regional trade
agreements.”30 The 1996 Standard Format is, however, purely voluntary31 and

27. GATT, supra note 5, art. X, ¶ 1.
28. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 104, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/
(follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple
Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS58/AB/R” under “Document symbol”); Appellate Body
Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 185, WT/DS70/AB/R
(Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under
“Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/DS70/AB/R”
under “Document symbol”).
29. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, ¶ 7(a).
30. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note by the Chairman, Standard
Format for Information on Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/6 (Aug. 15, 1996),
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents”
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therefore highlights a number of features in the WTO’s institutional culture
that make it difficult to expect complete transparency in relation to RTAs.
To begin with, the membership of the WTO is large and varied. In July
2008 it was composed of 153 members, a majority of which are developing
countries.32 While all WTO members share many common obligations, there
are many individualized obligations as well, and although progress has been
made in recent years in standardizing WTO reporting requirements,33 it can be
difficult to determine exactly how countries have implemented their
concessions and commitments. In addition, the staff of the WTO Secretariat
remains relatively small34 and is required to maintain its neutrality and
impartiality at all times. This means that it can only provide limited assistance
in the task of clarifying national concessions and commitments. Instead, the
work of doing so is often left to WTO Committees and the TPRM which
operate by means of question-and-answer sessions that diplomats can easily
evade or delay. This structure betrays an institutional culture of passivity.
Unlike other, more assertive international organizations like the EU,35 the
WTO membership remains firmly in the driver’s seat. Formally, there is very
little that can be done to compel a country to do something in WTO law,
including disclosure of the full terms of its participation in an RTA.
What these observations translate into in practice is that GATT Art.
XXIV:7(a) has been, and can be, interpreted loosely. From the bare text it is
not clear at what point “deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade
area”36 foresees, and therefore countries have argued about whether it means at
the outset of negotiations or just prior to their conclusion. In addition, the term
“shall promptly notify”37 is the subject of some ambiguity since some countries
have waited considerable time before notifying either the text or any
modifications of an RTA, meaning that effective review by the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements is stymied. A final concern with Art. XXIV:7(a)
is that the bare requirement of prompt notification, when combined with the
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/W/6” under “Document
symbol”).
31. Id.
32. Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
33. Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, Trade Policy Reviews, Ensuring
Transparency, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2008).
34. Understanding the WTO: The Organization, The Secretariat, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
35. Reference is made here to various legal actions possible by the European Commission,
the European Council, the European Parliament, and other bodies and individuals that have the
effect of providing an internal system of checks and balances within the Union.
36. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, ¶ 7(a) (emphasis added).
37. Id.
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voluntary nature of the 1996 Standard Format, says very little about exactly
what should be notified, an omission that has led over time to incomplete or
inconsistent notification of different agreements. This practice deprives third
parties of the ability to compare, and therefore to meaningfully challenge, what
is being notified and may even contribute to the institutional culture of
passivity referred to above.
The Preamble to the TM recognizes that RTAs “have greatly increased in
number and have become an important element in Members’ trade policies and
developmental strategies” and that the Mechanism is to apply to GATT Art.
XXIV, GATS Art. V and the 1979 Enabling Clause.38 In the case of
notifications under GATT and GATS, implementation of the TM is left to the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, while notifications under
paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause (involving RTAs between developing
countries) are left to the Committee on Trade and Development.39
An initial attribute of the TM is that it attempts to reinforce the notification
obligation by moving the relevant notification dates forward. Under the TM
countries that are considering forming an RTA must now report their
discussions to the WTO at the outset and keep it reasonably apprised during
the course of negotiations.40 This is the “early announcement” component of
the intensified obligation.
Second, under the existing wording of Art. XXIV:7(a), countries entering
into an RTA are required to “promptly notify” the WTO membership.41 What
“promptly notify” means is, as mentioned, unclear. The TM therefore requires
that when the RTA is signed, information about conclusion of the final
agreement is to be provided “as early as possible.”42 This is the “final
announcement” component of the obligation.
The third group of requirements relates to the provision and use of
information. The most significant change is with respect to the format in
which the information is to be provided.43 Countries are to submit a standard
set of information on their RTAs, which is collected by the Secretariat and
made available in an electronic database.44 Over time this requirement should
enhance comparability.
What becomes clear is that the WTO Secretariat is given a more
pronounced role in the collection and dissemination of this information. Under

38. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10.
39. Id. ¶ 18.
40. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
41. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, ¶ 7(a) (emphasis added).
42. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
43. Id. ¶ 7 (“[T]he parties shall make available to the WTO Secretariat data as specified in
the Annex, if possible in an electronically exploitable format . . . .”).
44. Id. ¶ 21.
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the TM, the Secretariat is now required to prepare an unbiased “factual
presentation” about the proposed RTA with the information submitted by the
parties,45 something that should provide a greater degree of neutrality and
objectivity to WTO decision-making. An Annex sets out required data on the
subject of tariff concessions, Most Favored Nation duty rates, product-specific
preferences and import statistics for the most recent three years preceding the
notification.46 In respect of services, substantially similar data is required, a
formulation necessitated by the fact that such information may be difficult to
obtain in relation to intangibles.47
The delicacy of the task entrusted to the WTO Secretariat is underlined in
TM paragraph 9, which states that “the factual presentation . . . shall be
primarily based on the information provided by the parties; if necessary, the
WTO Secretariat may also use data available from other sources, taking into
account the views of the parties in furtherance of factual accuracy.”48 It adds
that “[i]n preparing the factual presentation, the WTO Secretariat shall refrain
from any value judgment.”49 It also indicates that “[t]he WTO Secretariat’s
factual presentation shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement
procedures or to create new rights and obligations for Members.”50
Fourth, the TM also clarifies a number of process-related obligations. The
TM attempts to avoid stymieing the consideration process by ensuring that “the
timing of the data submission shall not exceed ten weeks—or twenty weeks in
the case of RTAs involving only developing countries—after the date of the
notification of the agreement.”51 Once notification has taken place and the
factual presentation has been prepared, the TM mandates that the “RTA shall
be considered by Members under the procedures established” in TM
paragraphs 6–13.52 This consideration of the RTA by the WTO membership
shall normally be concluded within a year following notification.53
To further minimize any potential for delay, the meeting to consider the
notified RTA is to be a “single” formal event,54 although how much attention
should be paid to this is probably more debatable than real given that astute
trade diplomats can potentially meet on an informal basis indefinitely.
Fifth, coupled with the above are obligations that arise as to notification
and reporting upon any changes to a previously notified RTA. For instance, in

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. arts. 7(b), 9.
Id. Annex, ¶ 2.
Id. Annex, ¶ 3.
Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 5.
Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 11.
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the case of “changes affecting the implementation of an RTA,”55 the change
triggering notification is defined, inter alia, as “modifications to the
preferential treatment . . . and to the RTA’s disciplines.”56 It is also
noteworthy that in TM para. 15 concerning the end of the RTA’s
implementation period, the parties are required to submit to the WTO a short
written report on the realization of the liberalization commitments in the RTA
that was the subject of the original notification.57 This synopsis is to be
distributed to the WTO membership, as are periodic updates.58
The TM is neither comprehensive nor permanent. TM Arts. 22–23 specify
that the TM “shall apply, on a provisional basis, to all RTAs”59 and that the
WTO membership will review and replace it in light of experience with a
permanent mechanism adopted as part of the results of the Doha Round.60
III. EXPERIENCE UNDER THE TM
Experience with the TM so far has been mixed. Although the EC
representative has described the first year of the Mechanism as “successful,”
comments made both by the CRTA Chairman and other countries display a
sense of unease at what is unfolding.61 It is clear that the TM places a certain
burden on the WTO Secretariat to prepare factual presentations, but even more
to the point, countries themselves are required to comment upon and question
the Secretariat’s work and they have not always done so promptly.
In summary, the 2007 Draft Report of the CRTA reveals that “prior to the
adoption of the TM, the Committee had completed the factual examination of a
total of 67 agreements, of which 46 [were] in the area of trade in goods and 21
in trade in services.”62 The report also reveals that “the Secretariat distributed
factual presentations of 13 RTAs, 11 of which were used as the basis for
RTAs’ consideration in the CRTA during 2007 . . . . Seventeen RTAs are

55. Id. ¶ 14.
56. Id.
57. Id. ¶ 15.
58. Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 17.
59. Id. ¶ 22.
60. Id. ¶ 23.
61. See WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 29
November 2007, WT/REG/M/48 (Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow
“Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search”
hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/M/48” under “Document symbol”).
62. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Report (2007) of the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, ¶ 6, WT/REG/18 (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter
Report to the General Council], available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents”
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter
“WT/REG/18” under “Document symbol”).
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scheduled for consideration . . . .; factual presentations of these RTAs are
currently under preparation . . . .63
There is a remaining backlog of sixty-four RTAs, comprised of thirty-six
RTAs for which the factual presentation is still to be done and twenty-eight
RTAs for which the factual presentation is on hold.”64
The foregoing numbers may appear impressive, but in the final CRTA
meeting of 2007 the Chairman noted that progress was slow: “only two (of a
projected 11) were on the agenda of the meeting, with the rest having been
rescheduled for 2008.”65 A number of difficulties have arisen with the TM’s
process. Some members continue to have problems respecting deadlines for
data submission, and in some cases the format and quality of data received
have not been as expected.66
An illustration of some specific problems is apparent from minutes of the
final CRTA meeting for 2007. For the EFTA-Tunisia goods agreement, “the
Secretariat had sent the draft factual presentation to the parties, although the
data for Iceland and Tunisia was still incomplete. The Secretariat was awaiting
comments from Tunisia on the factual presentation that had been sent [to it] in
July [2007].” 67 For the India-Singapore goods and services agreement, “the
factual presentation had been drafted but the Secretariat had encountered a
problem with India’s tariff and was awaiting clarification from the Indian
authorities.”68 For the Japan-Mexico goods and services agreement “the
Secretariat had received tariff data from both Parties, although there was some
data missing in the tariff of Japan. The Secretariat had received import data
from Mexico but was still missing trade data from Japan.”69 For the PanamaEl Salvador goods and services agreement, “the Secretariat had received data
that was not coherent . . . and was liaising with the Parties for clarification.”70
For the Turkey-Tunisia goods agreement, “the Secretariat had received data
from Turkey but was still awaiting the tariff phase down from Tunisia.”71
63. Id. The WTO Secretariat is also required “to prepare a factual abstract for those RTAs
for which the CRTA had concluded the factual examination by 31 December 2006 and for RTAs
notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause.” Id. ¶ 7. As of mid-November 2007, “[e]ight
factual abstracts [had] been prepared and placed on the WTO website; 30 were still awaiting
comments from the parties, and the remaining 39 were under preparation.” Id.
64. Note on the Meeting of 29 November 2007, supra note 61, ¶ 6.
65. Report to the General Council, supra note 62, ¶ 16.
66. Note on the Meeting of 29 November 2007, supra note 61, ¶ 8.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Note on the Meeting of 29 November 2007, supra note 61, ¶ 8. A number of questions
associated with this issue have been canvassed in the CRTA, such as when discussion of an RTA
can be considered completed and what ultimately completion means. See Note on the Meeting of
14–15 May 2007, supra note 12, ¶ 46. The United States has suggested that the conclusion of the

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

METRICS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

287

These details reveal a number of specific problems with the TM’s
operation. First, there is the fact that the deadline for submission of replies to
questions is nowhere spelled out. Countries can delay the TM process simply
by refusing to reply.72 Second, there is the potential for overlap in factual
presentations on both goods and services, and the need to do duplicate
presentations for each.73 The United States, in particular, has expressed
concern in this regard given “the distinctiveness of the obligations and of the
facts needed to be maintained.”74 Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is
the use that might be made of the information being provided.75 For instance,
Canada has cautioned “against thinking about additions that might depart from
the more factual elements of a database to other information that might put
[WTO] Members in a slightly uncomfortable position given the legal rules that
applied to Members’ obligations on RTAs.”76 Fourth, it remains to be seen
how the Mechanism is to deal with the measurement of RTAs between WTO
and non-WTO members as well as disciplines in many new RTAs such as
those involving investment, environmental protection and human rights that
formally fall outside of the WTO Agreement’s scope of coverage. A final
issue concerns what “review” under the TM signifies—transparency or simply

meeting should simply mean “that there was no need for further meeting and deadlines were
provided for receipt of questions and replies.” Id.
72. Id. ¶ 12.
73. Id. ¶ 14.
74. Id. ¶ 26.
75. Id. ¶ 25.
76. See discussion in Note on the Meeting of 14-15 May 2007, supra note 12, ¶ 25. In
addition, there is the issue of backlog. As of March 2007, there were “48 notified RTAs for
which factual presentations had to be prepared.” WTO Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14 March 2007, ¶ 19, WT/REG/M/45 (Apr. 30, 2007),
available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents” hyperlink under “Documents”
hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter “WT/REG/M/45” under “Document
symbol”). Second, there are existing agreements from the period 1987–1994 when no reports
were received and which were therefore not subject to any transparency provisions. In that case,
“the compromise [agreed to among countries] had been not to subject them to any more
procedures in the CRTA, but to have a brief abstract prepared by the [WTO] Secretariat.” Id. ¶
24. The United States has indicated that it “look[s] forward to more transparency in these
agreements and to holding consultations [on them]” because “some [are] of great importance such
as NAFTA.” Id. The TM specifies that “RTAs for which a working party report has been
adopted by the GATT Council and those notified under the Enabling Clause will be subject to
subsequent notification requirements.” Transparency Mechanism, supra note 10, ¶ 22(a). The
TM further specifies that “RTAs for which the CRTA has concluded the ‘factual examination’
prior to the [TM]” and those notified “under the Enabling Clause will be subject to” subsequent
notification requirements. Id. ¶ 22(b). Finally, the TM specifies that “[a]ny RTA notified prior to
the adoption of [the TM] and not referred to in subparagraphs (a) or (b) [of ¶ 22] will be subject
to” full transparency obligations under the Mechanism. Id. ¶ 22(c).
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the fact that the RTA has been reviewed? No clear answer has been given yet
to this question.77
In light of all of the above, it remains difficult to see how the TM will
accelerate the WTO’s approval of RTAs and therefore provide the WTO
system with any real benefit. Most evidently, the TM does not require actual
approval of notified agreements. It simply promotes transparency in the
notifications made.
IV. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
Experience with the TM to date suggests a need to look elsewhere for
inspiration as to how the Mechanism might be made more effective. There is
evidently the issue of compelling countries to cooperate with the TM’s
requirements by reporting in a timely, transparent and accurate fashion. If
current behaviour continues, it may be necessary for the WTO Secretariat to
become involved in a more assertive way by collecting “data available from
other sources” as contemplated in TM.78 This could take the form of
assembling material publicly disclosed by parties or by collecting information
made available to other international organizations, third countries and NGOs.
However, such an approach would be unlikely to resolve the deeper issue of
RTA approval, which can only be done by countries.
Attention also needs to be given to how the obligations in Art. XXIV
might be creatively reinterpreted away from a largely quantitative analysis.
Given that most of the information to be collected by the TM is of a
quantitative nature and that metrification can cause problems in terms of
estimation and “bottom-line” thinking, alternative measures of market
openness will need to be developed. The question remains how to do so.
One possible way forward is the use of methods developed in regulatory
impact assessment (RIA). An RIA is defined by the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development as “an analytical and systematic approach to
regulation encompassing a range of tools and techniques aimed at assessing the
impacts of regulation.”79 The genesis of RIA lies in the realization that
regulation can impose costs at the same time as it generates efficiencies. A
2007 OECD report notes that “[m]ost OECD countries rely on RIA to help
ensure development of efficient and effective regulation and reduce the burden
of regulation.”80 Further, “although an underlying consideration in a welldeveloped and comprehensive RIA should be to identify regulations that

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. ¶ 9.
Regulatory Reform and Market Openness, supra note 17, at 11.
Id.
Id.
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minimize trade restrictiveness,”81 in practice, trade restrictiveness in new
regulations is rarely measured explicitly, if identified at all.82
Such consideration is timely, given renewed interest over the past eighteen
months by the United States and EU in developing ways to include
international trade impacts in regulatory reviews. In November 2007, the
United States and European Union made a pledge to work together in this
respect in a joint paper released in the context of the Transatlantic Economic
Dialogue (TED).83 Later, in February 2008, “U.S. and European business
groups submitted detailed recommendations [on the paper] with the aim of
revising and strengthening the ability of the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the EU’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB) to rein in
regulations by other agencies seen as damaging international trade.”84 Further,
“[t]he proposals are controversial with consumer groups,” which regard them
as “dangerous to public welfare, because they could be used . . . to ambush
environmental and safety regulations with the argument that they could impede
trade.”85 It appears that the OMB and the European Commission are
“discussing possible regulatory harmonization and the inclusion of
international trade impacts in regulatory reviews . . . [which] could result in a
joint communiqué on the matter in May [2008] . . . .”86

81. Id.
82. Business, Consumer Groups Square Off On EU-U.S. Harmonization, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 29, 2008 at 12 [hereinafter Business, Consumer Groups Square Off].
83. Id.
In its comments, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce went beyond the paper’s
recommendation and proposed that OMB amend its Circular A-4, which governs
regulatory impact assessments to include the impact of a regulation on services trade.
This would be an expansion because the circular now only covers trade in goods.
In addition, the Chamber wants OMB to expand the definition of trade impacts to
include more than the impact on the flow of imports and exports. Sean Heather, a
Chamber expert, said investment impacts should also be measured on companies that set
up subsidiaries in either the EU or U.S., but do not necessarily export. According to the
Chamber, cost-benefit analyses should be released for public comment.
The EU, the Chamber recommends, should do more to make its regulatory process
transparent, enforce rules that require six-week comment periods, and give the IAB the
authority to stop bad regulations.
Id. at 12–13.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id.
86. Turkey—Restrictions On Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, supra note 9, ¶
9.148.
The ordinary meaning of the term “substantially” in the context of subparagraph 8(a)
appears to provide for both qualitative and quantitative components. The expression
“substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of
the Members of the [customs] union” would appear to encompass both quantitative and
qualitative elements, the quantitative aspect more emphasized in relation to duties.
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The possibility of focusing on trade impacts appears to run counter to
current trends in RIA conduct. Contemporary RIA features both “quantitative
and qualitative components,” as seen in Turkey—Textiles. Indeed, the
November 2007 U.S./EU paper “propose[s] three steps for measuring
international trade impacts, only one of which is presumptively quantitative:
demonstrating the need for a regulation that might impede trade, measuring the
degree that foreign and domestic businesses are affected, and looking at
international best practices for handling the issue subject to regulation.”87
A 2006 analysis of current trends in RIA reveals that there are five main
analytical methods used by top RIA performing countries, including:
a range of partial analyses such as [Small and Medium Enterprise (SME)]
tests, administrative burden estimates, business impact tests and other analyses
of effects on specified groups and stemming from certain kinds of regulatory
costs; risk assessment, aimed at characterizing the probability of outcomes a
result of specified inputs; various forms of sensitivity or uncertainty analysis
that project the likelihood of a range of possible outcomes due to estimation
errors. Uncertainty analysis is used to provide policymakers with a more
88
accurate understanding of the likelihood of impacts.

The same report notes that “[t]he economics thrust of RIA has always
favoured benefit-cost analysis (BCA) as the most inclusive and socially
responsible method of public decision-making.”89 The reason for this is that
economics offers the “important advantage of comparing costs and benefits
occurring at different points in time.”90 Further, “BCA is the method long used
by governments [to assess] investment projects such as roads and dams and
[was] adapted to more general regulatory policy issues in the 1970s.”91 It is
also the preferred method for regulatory assessment used by the United States
since 1981 and by Canada since 1992.92
Nevertheless, traditional concern about the “over-monetization of
impacts”93 means that mainstream BCA analysis is of a “soft form . . . in which
Id. This language was quoted with approval in a subsequent Appellate Body Report. See
Appellate Body Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 49,
WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ (follow “Official Documents”
hyperlink under “Documents” hyperlink; then follow “Simple Search” hyperlink and enter
“WT/DS34/AB/R” under “Document symbol”).
87. Business, Consumer Groups Square Off, supra note 82, at 12.
88. Scott Jacobs, JACOBS AND ASSOC., Current Trends in Regulatory Impact Analysis: The
Challenges of Mainstreaming RIA into Policy-making 34 (2006), available at
http://www.regulatoryreform.com/pdfs/Current%20Trends%20and%20Processes%20in%20RIA
%20-%20May%20 2006%20Jacobs%20and%20Associates.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Jacobs, supra note 88, at 34.
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quantitative and qualitative metrics are combined and presented
systematically.”94 Scott Jacobs states that “[t]here is no country in which
modern BCA insists on the monetization of all benefits and costs . . . .”95
Instead, he notes that “critics of BCA in RIA usually ignore this fact in favour
of an exaggerated and theoretical version of BCA that lends itself to
caricature.”96
BCA is the method best adapted to protecting a broad range of interests.
One of the key advantages of benefit-cost frameworks is that they encompass
the broadest range of impacts across the social-economic-environmental
spectrum. Hence, they are line with nearly universal political demands that
RIA methods address a wider range of public interests. In response, RIA
methods are embracing more and more impacts, including operational, capital,
dynamic costs and all major benefits using methods based on social welfare
theory.97
At the same time, soft BCA has been questioned, if not challenged, in
recent years by various types of partial analyses that consist of fragmenting
RIA among various kinds of subjects to look at different impacts.98 As Jacobs
observes, “the increase in partial analysis is not . . . any reasoned
dissatisfaction with [soft BCA] . . . ,” but rather the fact that “RIA is entering
the mainstream of policy and is coming under pressure from the many groups
who now understand that they have a stake in RIA.”99 Consequently, soft
BCA is evolving from “a technocratic tool of general interest into a political
and policy tool with constituency group impacts.”100 The outcome is a
politicization of the RIA process. Different assessments fragment “into
smaller, competing analyses.”101 Jacobs concludes:
unfortunately, in more and more countries, use of partial analyses, driven
by competitiveness issues and in part by political intent to serve vocal
constituencies, has actually resulted in fragmentation into competing policy
agendas, because the larger integrated framework is not clearly defined or
102
emphasized.

How might experience with RIA be assimilated into the WTO’s TM? Two
recent harmonization directives introduced by the Government of Canada
provide some ideas for an answer. In 2007, the federal government issued the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Jacobs, supra note 88, at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (CDSR),103 which was followed
by the Treasury Board’s release of Guidelines on International Regulatory
Obligations and Cooperation (“the Guidelines”).104 Both are aimed at
“managers, functional specialists and regulatory staff” and are supposed to
clarify expectations of the Treasury Board Secretariat when it exercises its
“challenge” function—that is, the ability to question, and if necessary
postpone, the introduction of new regulations.105 It is not hard to analogize this
function to what is supposed to happen under the TM in its assessment of
notified RTAs.
The Guidelines reveal that the overall goal is to “encourage greater
regulatory compatibility [with international regulations] when it can provide
the greatest overall benefits to Canadians.”106 In doing so, the Guidelines state
that Canadian federal “departments and agencies must undertake to meet
international regulatory obligations and cooperation (IROC) requirements . . .
in ways that maintain public confidence in the Canadian regulatory system.”107
The goal of regulatory compatibility “with key international counterparts”
is to allow the government of Canada to “reach policy goals more readily . . .
with lower costs to the government and to Canadians.”108 It also makes
possible “compliance with applicable international treaty law and its
implementation in Canada . . .” through “access to regulatory resources of
international bodies and other countries . . .” and “allow[s] Canada to
contribute its expertise and promote best regulatory practices internationally,
thus influencing standards elsewhere.”109 For these reasons, the CDSR and the
Guidelines encourage Canadian federal government departments and agencies
to:
take international regulatory cooperation (IRC) into account throughout the entire life
cycle of regulati[on], [including] development, implementation, evaluation, and review;
think strategically about how IRC can assist in achieving regulatory outcomes;
establish regulatory compatibility as a goal for regulators to achieve through the design
of regulations and through ongoing regulatory cooperation activities with key
international counterparts; actively consider IRC in the ongoing management of

103. Government of Canada, Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (2007)
[hereinafter CDSR], available at http://www.regulation.gc.ca/directive/directive-eng.pdf.
104. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Guidelines on International Regulatory
Obligations and Cooperation (2007) [hereinafter Guidelines], available at http://www.regulation.
gc.ca/documents/gl-ld/iroc-cori/iroc-cori-eng.pdf.
105. Id. at 1.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id. at 2.
109. Guidelines, supra note 104, at 2.
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regulatory programs . . . . and; regularly assess the effectiveness of their IRC
110
activities . . . .”

Most importantly, the Guidelines create a presumption in favour of
international regulation, which is phrased in the following terms: “[while] it is
recognized that there are cases where the pursuit of sound policy objectives
may require unique Canadian standards or regulations . . . a clear rationale for
this unique approach must be evident in the regulatory analysis.”111
At the same time, nothing in either the CDSR or the Guidelines requires
Canadian departments and agencies to automatically regulate according to
international regulations.112 Instead, the Guidelines only speak of cooperation
and set out considerations in choosing partners for regulatory activity.113
These are Canada’s existing partners in North America (the United States,
Mexico) and the EU.114 The rest of the world receives little reference.
Emerging and expanding economies are identified as the BRIC countries
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) and here regulatory cooperation is phrased in
defensive terms: it “should be geared to ensuring that Canadians receive
adequate protections on the products and services imported from these
countries and that Canadian products, services, and investors have ready access
to these emerging markets.”115 The Guidelines also recognize the dual nature
of international regulation, informing Canadian regulatory practice and
outcomes while also enhancing Canada’s “leadership role” in international
regulatory efforts.116
It seems clear from the Guidelines that compatibility with international
regulations in Canada is something that the Canadian government now
prioritizes, yet the absence of an explicit “trade effects” test is notable. In this
respect, the CDSR and Guidelines present an alternative vision to that of the
TED. The Guidelines make clear that achieving regulatory harmonization is
what is important. There is a belief in the validity of existing international
regulations and a subsisting desire to align with them. Canadian variants are to
be avoided unless necessary.
The TM might usefully employ a similar methodology in its assessment of
RTAs. For example, an RTA might be assessed to the extent that it departs
from internationally accepted regulations or, where some numeric assessment

110. Id. at 2–3.
111. Id. at 3.
112. CDSR, supra note 103, at 14; Guidelines, supra note 104, at 12 (This is generally true.
However, Appendix B of both the CDSR and Guidelines draw attention to certain specific
requirements applicable to technical regulations, conformity assessment procedures and sanitary
and phytosanitary measures. These have more of a prescriptive character.).
113. Guidelines, supra note 104, at 3.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id.
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is required, from an average calculated among the WTO membership. This
kind of measurement is already employed in WTO trade negotiations on such
subjects as tariffs and negotiating coefficients.117 A focus on more than simply
numbers would have the added benefit of drawing attention away from
numerical targets and of reaffirming that much of the benefit that arises from
international trade is, in fact, incalculable.
V. CONCLUSION
The TM is the latest phase in efforts to bring transparency and consistency
to the treatment of RTAs in WTO law. Uniformity is to be welcomed, but
there are many obstacles to its successful operation, not the least of which is
the willingness of countries to provide the necessary information. It is too
soon to tell if the difficulties it has experienced to date are simply teething
problems or something more serious.
In at least one respect, the accrual of information in the TM database and
its comparability should help to move the question of developing disciplines
for RTAs forward by emphasizing inconsistencies between RTAs. The
comparison will furnish some idea of what the degree of inconsistency should
be. At the same time, as noted, it would be unwise to measure those
differences in a purely quantitative way. Strictly quantitative analysis is likely
to provoke invidious comparisons and poison the negotiating atmosphere.
Techniques developed in RIA that involve regulatory harmonization and the
justification of deviating measures may ultimately be of greater assistance in
this regard.

117. NAMA Chair Floats Ideas to Break Logjam: U.S. Signals Flexibility, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 29, 2008, at 6.

